We present a stylized model of the over-the-counter markets in the tradition of Du¢e, Gârleanu, and Pedersen [14] with two distinctive features: (i) buyers have heterogenous preferences and their willingness to pay is private information and (ii) sellers become …nancially distressed if they cannot sell for too long. A unique steady-state equilibrium exists and it is characterized by predatory buying. Speci…cally, during periods where sellers are more likely to become distressed (e.g. during economic crises, …nancial turmoils etc.) buyers become more selective and hold o¤ purchasing despite the abundance of distressed sales and low prices. This reluctance triggers the number of distressed sellers to grow even further and forces them for additional price cuts.
Introduction
Over-the-counter (OTC) markets, unlike exchanges, operate via search and matching. An investor who wants to sell or buy an asset must …rst search for a counterparty. Transactions are typically bilateral and private, and prices are determined strategically taking into account the outside option of each participant. In a seminal paper Du¢e et al. [14] construct a search model of the OTC markets addressing these frictions.
Even though the model in [14] is based on search, it still portrays a rather standardized and transparent trading environment. In their model products are homogenous, investors are homogenous, and as the setup is based on complete information, every meeting automatically results in trade. OTC, however, is a blanket term covering a vast array of products with signi…cantly different characteristics. Some products are indeed standardized and transparent and therefore …t to the portrayal above e.g. centrally cleared products such as interest rate derivatives traded on the inter-dealer clearing house SwapClear or equities traded over DCTCC. However, there exists a range of other products that are not nearly as standardized and transparent, and therefore require a di¤erent modelling approach, e.g. mortgage-backed securities, emerging-market debt, equity derivatives, exotic derivatives including non-vanilla interest and currency derivatives. These products are highly di¤erentiated and non-standard and they are traded by a diverse investor base with wide-ranging needs and objectives.
Consider, for instance, the over-the-counter equity derivatives (OTCED). With a total notional amount exceeding $7 trillion, the OTCED market serves a wide variety of investors including large corporations, banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, public sector funds, sovereign wealth funds and so on. The ‡exibility in terms of product design and its private outlook helped the OTCED market ‡ourish over the years. The market o¤ers a signi…cant number of products that are not available on exchanges or clearing houses with strict rules, where products are too standard to accommodate the particular requirements of an ever-expanding and diverse investor base.
Furthermore OTCED transactions are executed through bilateral meetings and, due to the private nature of these transactions, the market is characterized by a lack of pre-trade transparency. A recent report by the Financial Services Authority & HM Treasury states: "OTC derivative markets are not subject to formal pre and post trade transparency requirements. As a result some market participants have better access to better information." 1 Indeed, characterizations such as "opaque", "murky" or "anonymous" appear frequently in the …nancial press describing such products. The opaqueness of the OTCED market implies that for most products only a limited amount of pre-trade public data is available, and therefore, investors can …nd out detailed product features only after getting in contact with sellers. The discussion thus far gives credit to construct a model where investors with heterogenous preferences operate in a non-transparent market that o¤ers a wide range of heterogenous products. To capture the notion of preference and product heterogeneity, we assume that the dividend of an asset consists of two components: a market-wide deterministic and aggregate component x, plus an idiosyncratic component v, which is a random draw from a known cdf. 2 The realization of v determines how good a …t the asset is for a buyer's tastes and preferences. Furthermore, to capture the idea that the market is opaque and characterized by a lack of pre-trade transparency, we assume that the buyer realizes the quality of the …t v only after linking up with the seller. The realization of v is the buyer's private information and it cannot be observed by anyone else. With these assumptions the probability of trade is endogenous; so, meetings are no longer guaranteed to result in trade. The search process, from buyers' perspective, amounts to …nding a good …t and in doing so, they follow a threshold rule: if the quality of …t in a match is su¢ciently high then the deal goes through, otherwise buyers walk away.
There are two types of frictions in the model: the …rst is meeting a counterparty and the second is whether or not the transaction materializes. The literature, spurred by Du¢e et al. [14] captures the former friction, but not the second. Those models are based on complete information, and therefore all meetings, by default, result in trade. 3 In reality, however, it is not uncommon at all for parties to walk away without trading; disagreement, in fact, is the more likely outcome. In addition, with the advancing communication technology, getting in contact with potential traders is easier than ever; hence the key friction is the latter-that is, whether the buyer wants to purchase or not. This, in turn, depends on whether the asset is indeed what the buyer is looking for. The endogeneity of the probability of trade implies that buyers can control, and in fact manipulate, the duration of sale, which brings us to the second component of the model; namely the fact that sellers can become …nancially distressed if they cannot sell for too long. 4 Sellers in …nancial markets can become distressed for a variety of reasons including nearing margin calls, pressing debt obligations, hedging motives, being caught in a short squeeze and so on. To incorporate this notion, we assume that there is an adverse shock that pushes regular sellers into a state of permanent distress. It is sensible to think that such a shock is more likely to arrive during episodes of economic crises, recessions and …nancial turmoils. We show that during such periods customers become more selective and hold o¤ purchasing despite the abundance of distressed sales and lower prices. By doing so they strategically slow down the speed of trade causing the percentage of distressed sellers to grow further. This, in turn, exerts more pressure on sellers forcing them for further price cuts. At the end, distressed sellers not only are forced to cut their already low prices, but also they …nd it more di¢cult to sell and exit thanks to buyers' reluctance to trade. This cycle, which we label as predatory buying, dries up liquidity and increases the cost of liquidation sales for distressed sellers. Indeed, from their point of view liquidity disappears when it is mostly needed. Though it lacks an agreed upon de…nition in the literature, predation is a prevalent feature of …nancial markets. A recent body of theoretical work explores various mechanisms through which predatory trading takes place e.g. Attari et al. [3] , Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] , Carlin et al. [9] . In Section 4.2 we discuss these papers in more detail; but at this point we want to point out that the aforementioned papers are not based on search and matching. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper exploring predation in a search model of the OTC markets and bridging the gap between the two strands of literature.
Model
We consider a continuous-time economy with a …xed supply a > 0 of indivisible assets that yield a ‡ow of dividends q. Investors are risk neutral and divided into four categories; buyers, non-trading owners, regular sellers and distressed sellers. Similar to Du¢e et al. [14] we have a 'closed loop' setting where no agent leaves the market and there is no entry from outside. The total measure of agents is …xed and exceeds a: Each buyer wants to purchase one unit of the asset to consume its dividends. After trading, buyers become owners and remain so until they are hit by a liquidity shock that turns them into regular sellers. The shock arrives with a Poisson rate and reduces the ‡ow value of dividends from q to zero, which is why sellers wish to trade and liquidate their holdings. 5 Once the asset has been sold, the seller comes back to the market as a buyer (see the ‡owchart). If regular sellers cannot trade for too long then they may become distressed. We model this notion by another idiosyncratic adverse shock, which, too, arrives at an exogenous Poisson rate : The shock is similar in nature to the liquidity shock above and may be associated with factors such as pressing debt obligations, margin calls from other positions and so on. Such di¢culties are more likely to arise during …nancial crises or recessions, so it is sensible to think that rises during such periods. Buyers and regular sellers discount future utility at rate e whereas distressed sellers are more impatient with > : A larger value of implies a more severe shock.
As discussed in the Introduction, investors possess heterogenous preferences. To implement this idea we assume that the dividend q of an asset consists of an aggregate component x plus an idiosyncratic component v, that is q = x + v:
The aggregate component x is same across all assets, whereas the idiosyncratic component v 2 [0; 1] is a random draw from the unit interval via the cdf F: Buyers di¤er in terms of their tastes and preferences, so the realization of v determines how good a …t the asset is for a buyer's preference. A high value of v indicates a good …t and a low value indicates a poor …t. We assume that v is independent across buyers, so the same asset may be liked by one buyer and disliked by another. From a buyer's perspective the search process amounts to …nding a high enough v: The value of v does not change over time; once an asset is purchased the buyer enjoys the same v forever. We impose the following assumption on F:
Assumption 1. The survival function = 1 F is log-concave, i.e.
The market is opaque and characterized by a lack of pre-trade transparency; hence we assume that the buyer realizes the value of v only after linking up with the seller and that this realization is private information. The seller cannot observe v (he only knows the cdf F that generates it), so he is unable to tailor the price individually, and therefore, he must quote the same price p for each customer. The probability of trade j is endogenous and depends on the seller's type, regular or distressed, denoted by j = r; d.
The market operates via search and matching and agents meet each according to a Poisson process. Speci…cally, a buyer meets a distressed seller at rate m d where > 0 denotes the search intensity and m d denotes the steady state measure of distressed sellers. Similarly, the buyer meets a regular seller at rate m r , where m r is the measure of regular sellers. Finally, a seller meets a buyer at rate m b ; where m b is the measure of buyers. 6 Before proceeding to the analysis, a remark is in order to explain why the trading mechanism in our setup is price-posting and not bargaining. Indeed, existing papers in the literature consider Nash or Rubinstein bargaining procedures and it would be interesting to explore the implications of our model under these pricing mechanisms. However, modelling bargaining with private information is a non-trivial task as multiple or a continuum of equilibria are common in such models (see [21] for an extensive discussion.) With price posting however, equilibrium is unique and can be characterized analytically. In this paper our goal is to understand how the presence of distressed sellers a¤ects prices, liquidity and buyers' search behavior and to that end the uniqueness of the equilibrium and the fact that equilibrium objects (prices, probabilities, measures of agents etc.) can be characterized analytically is indispensable. A second point in defense of using price posting is the result by Samuelson [31] , who shows that in bargaining between informed and uninformed agents, where parties may bargain by any procedure they deem appropriate, the optimal mechanism is for the uninformed agent to make a take-it-or-leave o¤er. This result indicates that the optimal pricing mechanism in our model is indeed price posting where the seller (the uninformed party) advertises a take-it-or-leave-it price.
Discussion on Modelling Assumptions
The model operates via search-and-matching, and more signi…cantly it exhibits product and preference heterogeneity. So, for the model to be relevant, the market in question ought to exhibit these traits, that is:-Investors should be somewhat in the dark about potential trading opportunities and it should take time to …nd and meet a suitable partner for a trade.
Second, and more importantly, products ought to be heterogeneous and non-standard, making it di¢cult for an investor to assess whether or not a product is indeed suitable for his speci…c needs before meeting the seller and scrutinizing the underlying structure of the product.
Examples for such markets include markets for mortgage-backed securities, equity derivatives, collateralized debt obligations and other structured credit products, which are indeed heterogeneous and non-standard and usually exhibit complex contractual features. Investors often …nd out the speci…c details only after linking up with the seller and analysing the underlying structure of the asset. In [18] 's terminology, products in these markets are indeed inspection goods: buyers cannot resolve the pre-trade uncertainty pertaining the good before inspecting it (i.e. examining its contractual aspects). Furthermore, a wide variety of investors operate in these markets-insurance companies, hedge funds, public sector funds, sovereign wealth funds-all of which have vastly different priorities, constraints and requirements; thus an asset that is a good …t for a particular investor may well turn out to be improper …t for another. 7 An OTC trade negotiation for such products is typically initiated when an investor …nds and contacts a seller and asks for terms of trade. This process refers to the search and matching friction above and it is addressed in the paper by the random matching process. Communication could be by phone, by email, by electronic query systems or, in some markets, through a broker, though we ignore the role of brokers in this paper. At this step the investor obtains the necessary information pertaining the product, and after analysing its underlying structure and the terms of trade o¤ered by the seller, he decides whether to carry on with the transaction or to walk away. This step refers to the second point mentioned above and this is where the parameter v comes into play.
We assume that the dividend of a product consists of two components: a market-wide aggregate component x, plus an idiosyncratic component v, which is a random draw from a known cumulative density function. The value of vis uncertain until the buyer meets the seller and the realization of v can be interpreted as the inspection process mentioned above. Upon realizing the value of v the buyer understands how good a …t the asset is for his tastes and preferences. This is a standard technique to accommodate the notion of product and preference heterogeneity in that no two assets are identical and an asset that turns out to be a good …t for one buyer may turn out to be a poor …t for another. An advantage of the technique above is the fact the by …xing the boundaries and the density function of v and varying x one can explore how equilibrium objects-prices, probabilities of trade-respond to the degree of product standardization in the market (see the discussion in Section 4).
Analysis

Steady State Measures
The asset is in …xed supply a, so the measures of agents in possession of the asset (owners + regular sellers + distressed sellers) add up to a; that is
The total measure of agents is also …xed and exceeds a: It follows that the steady state measure of buyers, too, is …xed and equals to
Without loss in generality …x m b = 1 so that equals to 1 + a: Remaining measures m o ; m r and m d are endogenous and are determined by the fact that in steady state the in ‡ow into a group of investors equals to the out ‡ow from it. Similar to Du¢e et al. [14] , we have a 'closed loop' setup in the sense that no agent leaves the market and there is no in ‡ow from outside (see Fig  1 below) .Consider distressed sellers. The in ‡ow m r consists of regular sellers hit by the adverse shock. The out ‡ow m d d comprises of sellers who trade and become buyers. Setting in ‡ow equal to out ‡ow yields
Now consider regular sellers. The in ‡ow m o consists of owners hit by the liquidity shock. The out ‡ow has two components: m r r which are regular sellers who trade and become buyers plus m r which are regular sellers who become distressed. Therefore
Proposition 1 Equations (1), (2) and (3) 
The measures depend on exogenous parameters ; a; and as well as the probabilities of trade r and d which are endogenous and controlled by buyers. 8 The fraction of distressed sellers in the market is given by
Note that increases as d falls: Indeed if buyers squeeze d then distressed sellers cannot trade fast enough and their prolonged presence in the market causes to grow. The growing , in turn, 8 The following table summarizes the signs of the partial derivatives of the measures with respect to the parameters of interest (the algebra is skipped):
A rise in the arrival rate of the liquidity shock turns more owners into sellers, so m d and m r rise while m o falls: Similarly a rise in the arrival rate of the adverse shock causes more relaxed sellers to become distressed; hence m r falls while m d goes up. The e¤ect of on the measure of owners m o is more subtle. The rising increases the fraction of distressed sellers, and distressed sellers trade faster than regular sellers; so, at the end, more buyers become owners, hence m o goes up. Using similar arguments, and the ‡owchart, one can explain the signs wrt j :
intensi…es competition among distressed sellers and forces them for further price cuts. This is the basic mechanism behind the predation result.
Value Functions of Owners, Buyers and Sellers
Letting denote the value function of an owner, we have
An owner keeps enjoying the idiosyncratic dividend v plus the aggregate dividend x until he is hit by the liquidity shock , which turns him into a regular seller, whose value function is denoted by r . Rearranging yields
Now turn to buyers. Letting denote their value function we have
where
The expression I j is the expected surplus to a buyer contingent on having met a type j seller: As long as the surplus (v) p j exceeds the opportunity cost the buyer purchases, otherwise he walks away. For any given price p j we conjecture an associated threshold (or 'reservation value') v j leaving the buyer indi¤erent between buying and searching i.e. satisfying
After substituting for ; the indi¤erence condition becomes
Buyers' decision is simple: purchase if v v j and keep searching otherwise. Clearly the probability of trade j is endogenous and equals to
where = 1 F is the survival function. As mentioned earlier, not all meetings result in trade; for trade to occur the asset has to be a good match for the buyer. Substitute from (6) into the expression for I j and use the indi¤erence condition (7) to obtain
The second step follows from integration by parts. Substituting I j we get a cleaner expression for buyers' value function:
Finally we turn to sellers. Desperate and regular sellers' value functions are given by
Expression X j is the expected net trade surplus to a type j seller. A seller encounters a buyer at rate and the buyer purchases with probability (v j ). If trade occurs the seller obtains price p j plus (he becomes a buyer now) minus j (he is no longer a seller): With this information it is easy to interpret d and r : Note that a regular seller keeps track of the possibility of becoming distressed as well, whereas a distressed seller will remain distressed until he sells. Note that
A type j seller solves
taking as given. 9 The function j is a weighted average of X j s; so, the optimal price p j must, by the Bellman principle, maximize the net surplus X j . The FOC, thus, is given by
Expression (10) is the net trade surplus for a seller and the fact that it is positive implies that, conditional on having met a buyer and that the buyer is willing to transact, the seller is willing to transact as well (instead of walking away). To see why, note that if the seller transacts then he obtains price p j plus the value of becoming a buyer , whereas if he waits then he continues to obtain j : Since p j + > j ; the former option outweighs the latter. 10 It is easy to verify the second order condition; thus the solution above corresponds a maximum. 11 Inserting the FOC into X j yields
Substituting this into (9) produces the closed form expressions for sellers' value functions:
Now we can de…ne the equilibrium.
De…nition 2 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is characterized by value functions ; ; d ; r given by (6) , (8), (9) and the pair v = (
+ satisfying indi¤erence (7) and pro…t maximization (10) . The steady state measures m d ; m r and m o ; also implicitly part of the equilibrium, can be recovered from (4). 10 Recall that our setup is a closed loop setting with no entry or exit. Provided that the outside option associated with exiting the market is normalized to zero, the no-exit condition is non-binding. Indeed the fact that both r and d , given by (11) and (12) , are positive implies that along the equilibrium path, all sellers, regular or distressed, would prefer to remain in the market even if they were allowed to exit. In the literature, the outside option is interpreted as the rate of return of a risk-free asset and it is typically normalized to zero e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] . From a broader perspective, theoretical models studying OTC markets, including this one, are partial equilibrium settings: the focus is the OTC market and other alternatives that investors might turn to (e.g. the "risk-free" market) are treated exogenously. To meaningfully discuss exit and entry decisions one needs a general equilibrium setup where the rate of return in the alternative market, too, is endogenous and investors are free to self select themselves into whichever market they want. This, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper. 11 We have
Substitute the FOC (and omit the argument v j ) to obtain
The expression is negative because of log concavity (Assumption 1).
Results
Existence of Equilibrium and Liquidation Sales
Combine indi¤erence conditions in (7) with FOCs in (10) to obtain the following system of equations that pin down the equilibrium values of v r and v d :
Proposition 3 The equilibrium exists and it is unique. In equilibrium distressed sellers pursue 'liquidation sales' as they accept to trade at lower prices and consequently sell faster, i.e. p d < p r and d > r :
In the proof we show that the locus of r = 0 is downward sloping wrt v r whereas the locus of d = 0 is upward sloping; so, they intersect once in the v r v d space, which implies that there exists a unique v satisfying (13) and (14) (the proof is in the appendix). Furthermore, the equilibrium is characterized by liquidation sales. After being hit by the adverse shock, a distressed seller grows impatient and quotes a lower price in an e¤ort to quickly exit from his position. (In section 4.3 we provide numerical simulations exploring the cost of such sales.) The price-cut produces the desired outcome: the inequality d > r implies that distressed trades materialize faster than regular trades.
Before moving on, we brie ‡y comment on the link between the aggregate yield x and the probability of trade. As seen above, from a buyer's point of view the search process amounts to …nding a high enough v since all assets yield the same deterministic x. So, it may appear that the aggregate yield x plays no role in determining the probability of trade; however this is not true. As it turns out, buyers pay little or no attention to v if x is large enough.
Remark 4 Both r and d rise in the deterministic component x of a product. Speci…cally
where x + and x ++ are thresholds given by (29) and (34 With some abuse in labelling, one can re-interpret this simulation by thinking of x as a proxy of product standardization in the market. To see why, note that E[v] and StDev [v] are …xed in the simulation whereas x ranges from 0 to 3. If a product has a high value of x, then the random …t v is relatively unimportant in that the product possesses little chance of not being compatible with buyers' preferences; hence it can be labelled as "fairly standard" (e.g. vanilla products traded via clearing houses). The opposite is true if x is small (e.g. exotic products traded through bilateral meetings). With this interpretation, panel 2a suggests that the probability of trade (and therefore the speed of trade) increases with product standardization: the more uniform the products the faster the trade. In addition, the probability of trade can be 1 if products are "standard enough" i.e. one does not need perfectly uniform products as in Du¢e et al. [14] to ensure that all meetings result in trade.
Predation
Proposition 5 If the adverse shock arrives more often, i.e. if rises, then the equilibrium price p d falls, yet the probability of trade d decreases, i.e. buyers deliberately delay purchasing from distressed sellers despite the falling prices.
It is sensible to think that the adverse shock is more likely to arrive during periods of turmoils and economic crises. The proposition says that during such times distressed sellers lower their prices, yet buyers become more reluctant to purchase. This behavior (labelled as 'predation') further increases the percentage of distressed sellers in the market and forces them for further price cuts.
The mechanism behind the result is this. An increase in causes sellers' and buyers' value functions to move in opposite directions making sellers worse o¤ and buyers better o¤. Speci…cally, the fraction of distressed sellers rises with and intensi…es the competition for distressed sellers. Realizing that many other sellers are in the same dire situation, distressed sellers are forced to cut their already low prices. The question is whether price cuts generate the desired outcome and the answer is no; indeed their probability of trade d falls instead of rising. To understand why note that distressed sales come with greater consumer surplus, which means that the rising boosts buyers' value of search. Realizing that there are plenty of good deals in the market, buyers hold o¤ purchasing and search longer, i.e. they lower d : This response has the following feedback e¤ect. By lowering d buyers strategically slow down the speed of trade and cause to grow further. The growing , in turn, puts additional downward pressure on prices and so on. For an illustration of these arguments see Figure 2b and 2c. The solid lines in panels 2b and 2c are the true values of and p d , whereas the dashed lines are what they would have been had the probabilities of trade remained intact. The di¤erence between the two lines, therefore, is due to predation mechanism described above. 12 Predation is a prevalent feature of …nancial markets, especially during …nancial crises where the adverse shock is indeed more likely to arrive. A recent body of theoretical work explores mechanisms through which di¤erent forms of predation may take place. For instance in Attari et al. [3] predators lend to …nancially fragile players in an e¤ort to obtain higher pro…ts by trading against them for a prolonged time. Carlin et al. [9] construct an equilibrium where cooperation among traders occasionally breaks down leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] , which is arguably the most in ‡uential paper in this literature, if a distressed trader is forced to liquidate, other strategic traders initially sell in the same direction driving down the price even faster and then buy back at the low price.
The aforementioned models are not based on search and matching. They take either the aggregate demand function or market price equations parametrically without deriving them explicitly from the mechanics and frictions of a decentralized market (as in the literature spurred by Du¢e et al [14] ). To our knowledge this is the …rst paper studying predation in a search model of the OTC markets and bridging the gap between these two strands of literature.
In addition, the papers above are all based on settings with heterogenous investors in terms of their size and their ability to take multiple positions and these assumptions are vital in producing predatory mechanisms in those settings. For instance, in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] it is the presence of large strategic traders and their ability to impact market prices single-handedly that triggers prices to fall to arti…cially low levels. Without such large players the predation mechanism in their paper (described above) cannot function. On the contrary, in our setting players are atomless and can only have a single position. 13 Our mechanism relies on the endogeneity of the probability of trade, which enables buyers to manipulate the speed of trade to their advantage. Such a mechanism does not require large investors; preference heterogeneity and private information are su¢cient.
Finally, note that in Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] during episodes of predation prices fall, but on the other hand, trade speeds up. In other words, distressed sellers are forced to sell at lower prices, but at least they are able sell and exit quicker than before. This is not the case in our model: during episodes of predation prices fall, yet distressed sellers …nd it more di¢cult to sell due to buyer's reluctance to trade. Anecdotal evidence suggests that our model's prediction is more in line with what happens in decentralized markets (…nancial or otherwise) during times of distress and turbulence. Indeed, during the last crisis the …nancial press was rife with news of buyers holding out despite the falling prices, slowness of trade and investors' apparent reluctance to make a move. Though such behavior may be attributed to uncertainty resolution or risk aversion, there is no doubt that some of that reluctance was indeed a strategic and deliberate e¤ort to obtain better deals in the future.
A Numerical Example
In what follows we provide some sensitivity analysis via numerical simulations. We set the search intensity = 125 so that an agent expects to meet 125 other agents a year, which is equivalent to one counterparty per two business days. Following the calibration in Du¢e et al. [15] the fraction of investors holding a position (sellers + owners) is assumed to be 0.8. To match this we set the supply of the asset a = 4:
14 Recall that = a + 1; so = 5: The deterministic dividend is normalized to x = 0; whereas the idiosyncratic dividend v is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the unit interval. We set = 0:05, which means that all agents, except distressed sellers, discount future utility at the annual rate (1 + ) 1 95%: Again, following Du¢e et al. [15] , the arrival rate of the liquidity shock equals to 0.5 meaning that an owner remains so for an average of 2 years. The arrival rate of the adverse shock is set = 6 i.e. on average a seller can last 12= = 2 months without trading before becoming distressed. Finally = 9; which means that distressed sellers discount future utility at the annual rate 1 + 1 = 10% . The table below which is very close to the median annual turnover of 51.7% estimated by Edwards et al. [17] . Similarly about 78:5% of agents are owners, 1.5% are sellers and 20% are buyers. Again, these estimates are very close to their counterparts in the calibration exercise in Du¢e et al. [15] (see Table 2 therein). Before we get into simulations, note the analysis so far was based on a steady state setup. Therefore, the simulations below depict snapshots of the economy at various steady states; however they are silent about the transition process between those states. For the dynamic version of the model, where we explore this transition, see section 5.2. Figure 3 depicts prices, probabilities and measures of agents against the arrival rate of the adverse shock : An increase in has three consequences. First, more sellers become distressed and attempt liquidation sales; see the rising in panel 3c. Second, all sellers, regular and distressed, trade at lower prices (panel 3a). Third, customers become more reluctant to purchase from distressed sellers; the probability of trade for those sellers keeps falling (panel 3b). We have already discussed the mechanism behind this result, but there is a point to add here.
Regular sellers, too, are worse o¤ because of the rising . Facing an increasing prospect of becoming distressed in the future, they signi…cantly reduce their prices in an e¤ort to quickly sell before being hit by the adverse shock (see the falling regular price in 3a). This reaction can be described as the spillover of distressed sales onto the regular sales and it can be indeed signi…cant. To quantify this negative e¤ect we start from a benchmark where = 2 (the rest of the parameters are as in Table 1 ) and then we plot the percentage drop in the regular price against the increasing . When = 2 a seller can go on for 12= = 6 months, on average, before becoming distressed and at that point the equilibrium value for the regular price p r is about 7.42. In Figure 4a we plot the percentage drop p r ( ) =7:42 1 against and it is clear that the price drop can be substantial if increases signi…cantly. For instance if rises from 2 to 6 then the regular price falls by about 75%. 
Cost of Liquidation Sales
Distressed sellers accept substantially lower prices when they try to liquidate. For instance, under the benchmark parameters of Table 1 the equilibrium price in a distressed sale p d = 0:98 is about 40% less than the price in a regular sale p r = 1:75. The price cut produces the desired outcome: conditional on meeting a buyer, a distressed seller has a d = 63% chance of trading as opposed to r = 21% for a regular seller. Clearly, attempting a liquidation sale is costly. Had the seller not become distressed, he would have traded at p r but the shock forces him to trade at the lower price p d : We use the percentage-wise pro…t loss
as a proxy for liquidity. The lower the value of , the more costly the sale, the lower the liquidity. In panel 4b we plot against the frequency of the adverse shock and it is clear that falls exponentially in : Indeed when the shock is rather infrequent ( 3), i.e. if a seller can go on for 12= = 4 months or more without being distressed, then the pro…t loss is less than 10%. However the loss grows rapidly as grows beyond 3.
The cost of liquidation is also related to the degree of product standardization; speci…cally the more standardized products a seller holds the less costly the liquidation sale. To establish this relationship, start with the coe¢cient of variation
to measure how standard (or homogenous) the products are: the lower the value of s the more standardized the products (e.g. vanilla interest rate derivatives traded over clearing houses) and the higher the value of s the opposite (e.g. exotic swaps traded bilaterally). The simulation in 4c plots the pro…t loss against s and it is clear that attempting a liquidation sale when holding standard (vanilla) products is signi…cantly less costly than doing so when holding non-standard (exotic) products. 15 These insights are in line with the empirical literature on forced asset sales, which provides several examples and anecdotes where transaction prices deviate from fundamental values due to forced sales. Pulvino [29] studies commercial aircraft transactions initiated by constrained versus unconstrained airlines and …nds that commercial airplanes sold by distressed airlines bring 10 to 20 percent lower prices when compared to planes sold by regular airlines. Campbell et al. [7] consider forced selling in the real estate market due to events such as foreclosures and …nd large foreclosure discounts, about 27 percent on average. Coval and Sta¤ord [11] examine institutional price pressure in equity markets and …nd that widespread selling by …nancially distressed mutual funds leads to transaction prices that are signi…cantly below the fundamental value.
Extensions
Distressed Buyers
In this section we extend the benchmark model by considering the fact that buyers, too, may become distressed if they are unable to transact. Similar to sellers, buyers may have pressing reasons for acquiring a particular product due to, for instance, speculation, diversi…cation or hedging purposes including spreading and shifting risk associated with a portfolio position. Consequently, they may become more eager to purchase if they cannot trade for too long. 
The …rst line focuses on the pool of regular sellers. The in ‡ow m o consists of owners who are hit by the liquidity shock. The out ‡ow has two components. The …rst one is Flow 1, which is discussed above. The second one is s m s;r which is the number of regular sellers who become distressed. The second line deals with the pool of distressed sellers. The in ‡ow consists of regular sellers who become distressed ( s m s;r ); whereas the out ‡ow consists of distressed sellers who trade and become buyers (Flow 2). Finally the third line deals with the pool of distressed buyers. The in ‡ow consists of regular buyers who become distressed ( s m s;r ); and the out ‡ow consists of distressed buyers who trade and become owners (Flow 4). 16 The asset is in …xed supply, so we have
Next we turn to the value functions. Unlike the benchmark, there are now two value functions for buyers: one for distressed buyers, denoted by d , and the other for regular buyers, denoted by where
The expression I i;j is the conditional expected utility of a type i buyer who meets a type j seller. As long as the net surplus of becoming an owner, given by (v) p j ; exceeds the opportunity cost of remaining as a buyer, given by i , the buyer purchases; otherwise he walks away. Note that, unlike the benchmark model, the value function of a regular buyer now has a component, given by b ( d s ) ; that deals with the possibility of the buyer becoming distressed. For a given pair i and p j there is an associated threshold (or 'reservation value') v i;j leaving the buyer indi¤erent between buying and searching i.e.
Note that there are four di¤erent thresholds valuations: v r;r ; v r;d ; v d;r and v d;d (recall that in the benchmark there were only two, v r and v d ): So, the probability that a meeting between a type i buyer and type j seller results in trade is equal to (v i;j ) : Going through the algebra steps in Section 3.2 one can show that value functions d and r can be re-written as follows
Now turn to sellers. The value functions for distressed and regular sellers are given by
Consider 
Substituting the FOC into the value functions yields
Observe (15)- (19) . However, even though the methodology is straightforward the algebra does not lend itself for an analytical solution, so we proceed via numerical simulations. The parameters of interest are s and b ; which are the arrival rates of the adverse shocks that push sellers and buyers into the state of distress. It is sensible to think that s and b rise and fall together, so we have b = c s for some positive c: Below we simulate the equilibrium objects (prices and probabilities of trade) for c = 1 i.e. b = s = (simulations with di¤erent values of c produce similar results). Remaining parameters are as in Table 1 . 6a 6b Figure 6a and 6b depict, respectively, the prices and the probabilities of trade against the arrival rate of the adverse shock : Distressed sellers are impatient to transact, so they post lower prices in order to sell quickly (6a). Distressed buyers are also impatient, so they become less selective and start paying little attention to the idiosyncratic component of the asset, which means that they are more likely to buy when compared to a regular buyer under the same circumstances. Indeed, note that (v d;r ) > (v r;r ) and
It follows that the meeting that is most likely to result in trade is the one where a distressed seller meets a distressed buyer as both parties are most eager to trade. Similarly, the meeting that is least likely to result in trade is the opposite case where a regular seller meets a regular buyer as neither party is in a hurry. The other two scenarios, where a regular seller meets a distressed buyer and a distressed seller meets a regular buyer, lie between these two extremes. 17 The simulation in 6a further reveals that prices are hump-shaped in . To understand why note that from a seller's perspective a rise in has two contrasting e¤ects. On the positive side it increases the number of distressed buyers, who are ready to pay more, which induces sellers 17 Note that when 0 a distressed seller is highly likely to make a sale: if he meets a distressed buyer the probability of trade is almost 1, and if he meets a regular buyer the probability of trade is close to 40%, which is signi…cantly higher than a regular seller's chance of making a sale under the same circumstances (less 10%). The reason is that when is so small there are very few distressed players in the market. A buyer who meets a distressed seller knows that he is very unlikely to encounter another seller with such a low price, so the buyer becomes signi…cantly less selective about how good a …t the asset is.
to raise their prices. On the negative side the rising causes more sellers to become distressed, which in turn induces them to lower their prices. The simulations suggest that the positive e¤ect is dominant if is small and the negative e¤ect is dominant if is large: if 0 (if shocks are highly unlikely) then sellers increase their prices in order to take advantage of the few distressed buyers present in the market; however as grows large the second e¤ect starts to kick in, bringing down the prices.
Notice that even though prices may eventually fall; the drop is not as sharp as it was in the benchmark model. For instance, if rises from 2 to 6 then in the benchmark model prices fall by about 75% (see 3a), whereas in here they fall by about 15% (both simulations are based on the parameter values in Table 1 , so they are comparable). The reason is that in the benchmark model did not a¤ect buyers whereas in here it does, which, from a seller's perspective, is a welcome outcome. Indeed the rising pushes more buyers into a state of distress, making them willing to transact at higher prices. This e¤ect prevents prices from falling as sharply as they did in the benchmark.
A …nal observation is this. The trajectories of the probabilities in 6b have generally the opposite pattern of the trajectories of prices in 6a: if prices rise then the probabilities fall and if prices fall then the probabilities rise. The exception is distressed sellers: even though they decrease their prices, their probabilities of trade (v r;d ) and (v d;d ) still keep falling. This is the predation result discussed in the benchmark, and the simulation suggests that it is present in this version of the model as well. Notice, however, the extent of predation is signi…cantly less pronounced in here than it was in the benchmark. Indeed, a comparison between Figure 3 and Figure 6 reveals that the percentage-wise drops in prices as well as in probabilities are larger in the benchmark than they are in here. 18 This is not surprising, because, as mentioned above, in addition to its impact on sellers, now has an adverse impact on buyers as well, so if rises then everyone in the market, not just sellers, face a higher likelihood of becoming distressed. This consideration …lters into sellers' and buyers' value functions and thereby prevents prices and the probabilities of trade from decreasing as sharply as they did before. From a risk management point of view, these observations suggest that in periods of high volatility (e.g. when rises) …rms must not rush into lowering prices. Instead they ought to assess whether and to what extent potential customers may become distressed and they should make their pricing decisions accordingly.
Dynamics
We now construct a dynamic version of the benchmark model. This extension will allow us to explore the transition process through which the economy responds to an exogenous shock and how it approaches to the new steady state. Speci…cally we are interested in the shock's immediate e¤ect on equilibrium objects and the time-pattern of the recovery. To start, note that the measures of agents evolve according to
These expressions are similar to their counterparts in the benchmark except now we have the time di¤erentials _ m d ; _ m r and _ m o : Buyers' value function is given by
where at each point in time thresholds v d (t) and v r (t) satisfy the indi¤erence condition
Sellers' value functions are given by
Recall that 0 = 0 i.e. an individual seller fails to realize how his pricing decision a¤ects buyers'
value function : Here we further assume that _ 0 r = _ 0 d = 0 i.e. sellers fails to internalize the e¤ects of their pricing decisions on time di¤erentials _ r and _ d : With this simpli…cation, the FOC of a type j seller is given by
and therefore 
Totally di¤erentiating this equation wrt to time yields (recall that _ 0
where @ j =@v r and @ j =@v d are given by (25) and (26) 
Observe that substituting _ v r = _ v d = 0 yields the steady state equilibrium conditions in the benchmark. However, analytically characterizing the solution of this system is a non-trivial task. To proceed we simulate the system using the parameters in Table 1 In what follows we simulate how the economy responds to a sudden and permanent rise in : We set the initial value of to 1 indicating that regular seller, on average, lasts 12/ = 12 months without becoming distressed. At date t = 0 the value of suddenly jumps to 6. Figures 7a and 7b depict trajectories of prices as well as the measure of distressed sellers in response to this shock. The sudden rise in the arrival rate of the adverse shock triggers an immediate and sharp drop in prices, which is then followed by an extended reversal phase. Note that prices initially over-react to the shock and fall below their new steady state level, only to recover afterwards. The recovery phase occurs within the …rst month whereas the convergence to the new steady state appears to take about six months. Du¢e [13] , in his presidential address to the AFA, explores various mechanisms causing similar overreactions in price dynamics. These include the relatively small subset of risk-bearing capacity that is immediately available to absorb a shock on short notice, institutional impediments to capital movement and investors' occasional lack of attention to trade. In our case the underlying reason behind the overreaction is the temporary glut of distressed sellers in the market. Indeed, the simulation in panel 7b reveals that within a few weeks after the sudden rise in there are four times as many distressed sellers in the market as they were before. Consequently, prices overreact to this glut and fall below their steady state level. As the glut resolves prices recover and converge to the new steady state.
Notice that the pattern of the prices in response to the shock and the prolonged amount of recovery time lends support to the search model in the context of OTC markets. There is signi…cant empirical evidence that supply and demand shocks in asset markets, in addition to triggering an instant price reaction, lead to corrections that take a relatively prolonged amount of time. For instance, after major downgrades or defaults in OTC corporate bond markets one typically observes large price drops which are followed by delayed recovery phases e.g. see [19] and [10] . A similar scenario is reported in [25] , who found that after large capital redemptions in 2005, convertible bond prices dropped immediately and rebounded only after several months.
In these examples the time pattern of the prices after the external shock reveals that the friction at work is not a transaction cost for trade. Indeed, if this were the case then investors would instantaneously modify their portfolios and the new price would be established very soon after the shock and it would remain there until the arrival of the next shock. In these examples, however, the price initially over-reacts to the shock and the correction takes a prolonged amount of time. The speed of adjustment, at least in part, is a re ‡ection of search frictions in the market-i.e. the fact that it takes considerable time and e¤ort (especially during times of volatility e.g. after an external shock) to …nd new investors and to negotiate the new terms with them.
What is remarkable, our simulations show that, just as observed empirically, prices initially overreact to the shock and it takes a signi…cant amount of time until they recover and approach to their new steady state levels. This is indeed in line with the empirical papers referenced above, and therefore it gives further credit to the search-and-matching model to be used in the context of OTC markets.
Risk Management
The arrival rate of the adverse shock is exogenous. As a result there is not much a regular seller can do for not being hit by the shock except for trying to sell as quick as possible. The exogeneity of the adverse shock, admittedly, hinders our model's ability to talk about strategies on how to prevent the shock or perhaps how to delay it; but, nevertheless, our results still o¤er some valuable insights into risk management.
First, the under shooting of the price is indeed signi…cant. The simulation in panel 7a suggests that both the regular price and the distressed price initially fall about 25% below the new steady state level and the recovery phase takes about a month. These observations indicate that risk management should take into account the time frame in which assets are marked-to-market, especially if the position is secured via collateralized …nancing. Risk management should be mindful of the fact that during times of …nancial distress (e.g. when suddenly goes up) it takes signi…cantly longer to sell (because of predation) and that the market price undershoots signi…cantly before it recovers. These details ought to be built into the contract when obtaining the loan to secure the position. Otherwise the loan provider, e.g. the broker, might mark-to-market too aggressively in an e¤ort to trigger a margin call and liquidate the collateral. 19 Furthermore, in the light of the spill-over result discussed earlier, one should take into account the inter-dependant nature of …nancial markets and the indirect e¤ects and repercussions of a potential shock hitting trading partners or related investors. Said di¤erently, a prudent risk management strategy should depend on …nancial standing of related traders and should have scenarios drawn against the possibility that they may fall into distress. An example for such a measure is JP Morgan's dealer exit stress test, which assesses the risk that a rival is forced to withdraw from the market. 20 
Conclusion
This paper contributes to a recent literature spurred by Du¢e et al. [14] studying the OTC markets via search and matching and complements this literature by assuming that (i) buyers' preferences are heterogenous and their willingness to pay is private information and that (ii) sellers are heterogeneous in terms of their urgency to sell. A search equilibrium exists and it is unique. In equilibrium distressed sellers pursue liquidation sales-that is, they signi…cantly undercut their competitors in an e¤ort to quickly trade and exit from their positions. Liquidation sales are associated with considerable pro…t losses, but more importantly they open the door for predation. Indeed we demonstrate that during periods where an increasing number of sellers become distressed, buyers deliberately hold o¤ purchasing from such sellers, which in turn exerts more pressure on them and forces them for further price cuts-an outcome which we call predatory buying. 19 Brunnermeier and Pedersen [6] provide an anecdote for such an outcome involving Granite Partners (Askin Capital Management), who held very illiquid …xed income securities: "[Granite's] main brokers-Merrill Lynch, DLJ, and others-gave the fund less than 24 hours to meet a margin call. Merrill Lynch and DLJ then allegedly sold o¤ collateral assets at below market prices at an insider-only auction in which bids were solicited from a restricted number of other brokers excluding retail institutional investors." 20 Step 2. Liquidation Sales-. First we will show that v d < v r ; which, in turn, implies that In the …rst line, the expression in square brackets is negative because 
